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# Intelligence Report

*The CPSU Under Brezhnev*

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
# ***The CPSU Under Brezhnev***

## **Part 1 Party Membership**

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## THE CPSU UNDER BREZHNEV

### Part I: Party Membership

#### Summary

Today the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is larger than it has ever been, with more than 15 million members—almost 9 percent of the population old enough for admission. Under the leadership of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the party's growth has been slowed, however, and membership has become more difficult to attain. An exchange of party cards—the first since 1954—has been completed. Despite early concern that this exchange might signal a purge, it has apparently been used primarily to strengthen internal party discipline and to activate passive members.

The tightening up on admissions has altered the balance among the various age groups in the party. Party members and candidate members in the 26-40 age bracket are still the largest group, but their percentage—38.4—is unprecedentedly low, while the proportion of those over 50—26.7 percent—is unprecedentedly high. The aging of the party membership raises the possibility of a generation gap in the future between the party and the adult population as a whole.

People brought into the party within the past 10 years—under Brezhnev's leadership—make up the largest group (41.6 percent), followed by recruits from the Khrushchev years (26.9 percent). For perhaps the first time in the party's history, however, less than 20 percent of its members have joined in the past five years.

Recruitment policies have continued to emphasize blue collar workers, who now account for 40.7 percent of the membership. On the other hand, the proportion of "officials, specialists, and intellectuals" has also risen, to 32 percent. There is, of course, a certain amount of game-playing by the Soviet authorities in these publicly announced categories—for example, the conversion of a collective farm to a state farm which is done by fiat magically converts "peasants" into "workers" overnight. Nevertheless, the figures as announced project the image the party authorities want to present and to that extent have a validity of their own. Reliance on the "workers" is required by doctrine. The increased representation of specialists and intellectuals is a tacit admission that it takes more than loyalty to working class interests to run the Soviet Union.

*This is the first of two Intelligence Reports on the CPSU. The second will deal with party bureaucracy. This was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in consultation with the Office of Political Research. Comments and queries may be directed to*

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The current leadership has frequently claimed that the party has become more "international" in recent years, but the fact is that the slowdown in recruitment has reduced the pace at which ethnic minority representation has increased. Russians are now as over-represented in the party as in 1965. The Slavic peoples—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—account for 80 percent of the party membership, and this situation is likely to continue for some time. Only the Muslim peoples have the potential for growth on a scale that could cut into the Slavic majority in the party with telling effect. They are the ones with the fastest-growing population, and they are still very much under-represented in the party. Much of their population is still too young for party membership, but when the young people come of age and local economic conditions improve, party recruitment among those minorities could lead to a significant reduction of the Slavic majority.

Brezhnev's accomplishments as General Secretary of the CPSU have been considerable. Under his stewardship, the friction between generations in the party has been smoothed over. The party's overall growth pattern has become slower and smoother and now approximates the growth of the population as a whole. It has regained its status as an elite, and no important segment of the population is so under-represented—or so free from party control—that a major recruitment drive is needed.

There are, nevertheless, some difficult decisions looming—if not for him, for his successor. Admissions of young people will have to increase substantially in the late 1970s and 1980s to maintain even the current low level of youth recruitment. Failure to maintain this level could lead to the development of a serious generation gap, with youth in effect frozen out of the party. As the percentage of older party members continues to rise, a recruitment drive among youth could be accomplished without significantly increasing the size of the party, but it would have a real impact on the party's age structure as well as on the percentage of newcomers in the membership. Any such drive would re-open the possibility of the generational friction that was Khrushchev's legacy to Brezhnev. It would also re-open the vexing question of skills and expertise as opposed to party loyalty. Further down the road, decisions must be made concerning the most under-represented groups—the Turkic nationalities with Muslim backgrounds. These decisions will become increasingly troublesome as the Central Asian birth rate continues to rise.

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## **Introduction**

Since its infancy, when it was merely one of several small conspiratorial groups operating in Imperial Russia, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup> has become the single most important institution in the country. The only political party that has been allowed to operate in the open at any time since the early 1920s, its membership has increased to more than 15 million—almost nine percent of those who have reached admission age. It includes most of the people holding key jobs in Moscow or elsewhere at home and abroad.

The party is a government within a government. It controls the activity of the other institutions and public organizations and the activities of tens of thousands of factories, farms, hospitals, schools, and stores in the Soviet Union.

Like any other political organism, its health depends on both its leadership and its composition. Its leader has been variously called either the General Secretary or the First Secretary. He has, throughout Soviet history, been the most powerful man in the Soviet Union, but his primary job is the management of the CPSU itself.

The CPSU has had only four leaders in its history—Lenin, who founded it, Stalin who molded it and left it rigid with terror, Khrushchev who tried to revitalize and modernize it, and Brezhnev who seems to have tried to find a middle ground between the old ways and the new. This paper is a study of the CPSU that General Secretary Brezhnev inherited from First Secretary Khrushchev in 1964, what he has made of it during his 11-year stewardship, and the longer term problems that he will leave, in turn, for his successor.

## **Khrushchev's Legacy**

As the party's role in Soviet society has changed, so has its make-up. Lenin's revolutionaries, confronted with the responsibility of steering the course of a new country, were joined—often with reluctance on both sides—by specialists whose skills were essential for the new tasks. Stalin oversaw a series of mass recruitment campaigns, but these were to some extent offset by the Great Purge of the mid-1930s and the losses suffered in World War II. The party's pride was that it was a narrowly based "vanguard," an elite bound by devotion to Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. An effort was made to ensure that workers and peasants were recruited into the party of the "proletariat," but in fact in Stalin's later years the proportion of party members engaged in white-collar jobs increased. On the eve of Stalin's death in 1953, he appeared to be preparing to unleash another Great Purge. His successor, Khrushchev, inherited a demoralized party whose officials were frozen into near-immobility by the threat of yet more terror.

## **Khrushchev: Party of the Whole People**

As part of his effort to "thaw" the CPSU, Khrushchev oversaw a rapid increase in the size of the membership during the late 1950s and early 1960s. His

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recruitment campaign began to transform Stalin's narrowly based "vanguard" into a "party of the whole people"—an institution much more akin to a mass organization. By the end of the Khrushchev period, the party included 8 percent of the adult population, and over 5 percent of the entire population. Both figures were higher than those for any previous point in the party's history, and well above what they had been ten years earlier (Table I).

### **Youth**

This influx made it increasingly difficult for the party to maintain its sense of being an elite corps bound together by the high political consciousness of its members. Too many of the new recruits were people who had joined the party for a better job, a chance to travel abroad, and other personal benefits. On the other hand, it did make it possible for the party to avoid growing older. Both the percentage of the party members who were 40 years of age or younger and the percentage of those who had joined the party within the last ten years were as high in January 1965 as in January 1956 (Table II).

### **A Party of the Proletariat**

The rapid growth in the size of the party during the Khrushchev years was also accompanied by a significant increase in the percentage of blue collar workers and farmers among the members (Table III). This influx of blue collar workers and farmers strengthened the party's ties with the working class and the peasantry, but many of these "representatives of the masses" had been brought into the party to fill a quota and had little or no interest in playing the political activist role expected of party members.

The effort to revive the party's proletarian ties did not mean that the concept of the party as an elite had been abandoned. In fact, the education level of the party membership continued to rise during the Khrushchev enrollment as many of the so-called blue collar workers and farmers who were recruited into the party during this period were specialists—not rank-and-file bench workers or field hands (Table IV). By the same token, the drop in the percentage of white collar workers was largely at the expense of those who were semi-skilled office workers.

### **Khrushchev's Ethnic Balance**

The Khrushchev enrollment brought further improvement in the status of women within the party, but they were still outnumbered four to one when Khrushchev left office. Of more immediate significance was the reduction in the over-representation under Lenin and Stalin of the Russians, Georgians, and Armenians. Under Khrushchev, an effort was made to bring the party closer to a national one, and this ethnic and geographic imbalance was somewhat reduced. The other European minorities gained ground, but the peoples of Central Asia and other ethnic groups with a Muslim background continued to be



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under-represented. Although some of the latter also increased their percentage of party membership during the early 1960s, these increases fell short of what was required to keep pace with their relatively high birth rates (Table V).

### **Interregnum: Pandora's Box**

The months following Khrushchev's fall brought evidence of an extraordinary mood of introspection in the party, indicated by public debate on questions as basic as the proper role of the party in Soviet society. Behind these discussions among lower level party officials and intellectuals lay the acknowledged fallibility of past leaders—Stalin, whose publicly discussed mistakes went back to 1917, and Khrushchev, ousted for "harebrained schemes." Ahead was an increasingly complex economy in which specialized knowledge would become more and more important—one in which good tensions, no matter how highly motivated by Marxist-Leninist fervor, would be much less effective than technical expertise. Complicating the discussions was the impact of a new generation on whom the party had to depend for its future existence, but which was generally better educated than its elders, and certainly had a different outlook on the points at issue.

An organization in which recruitment and promotion standards were based primarily on technical expertise, rather than on political loyalty, would be quite different from the Communist Party of Lenin and Stalin. Meanwhile, the trend toward selection on the basis of technical knowledge was providing the basis for a good deal of friction between older party officials and the production-oriented younger recruits.<sup>2</sup> This conflict of generations was heightened by the rapid increase in the party membership during the period after the 20th Congress in 1956, and there was evidence that this rapid growth itself had caused considerable emotion. Thus, another issue raised in the debate about party work related to the composition and nature of the party. Stated most broadly, the question was whether the party should be a mass organization or a close-knit elite.

### **Brezhnev: Stabilization in Growth**

One of the first steps taken by the Soviet leadership to get these troublesome questions back in the box was to brake the pace at which the party membership was growing and changing in its composition. The slowdown began in July 1965, shortly after the CPSU Central Committee had issued resolutions criticizing the admissions and training policies of the Kharkov Oblast party committee, and of the party organizations and political organs in the Odessa Military District and in the Baltic Fleet.<sup>3</sup> Both resolutions condemned the emphasis on numbers that had led many local party units to accept virtually all applicants, noting that a failure to carefully screen the political, professional, and moral qualities of applicants had contributed to a rise in the number of candidate members expelled from the party for various offenses.

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The resolutions also complained that some local party units had been issuing blanket instructions on the proper balance between blue collar workers, farmers, and white collar workers among the new recruits. Local party committees were to consider the conditions at the enterprise in question before issuing any guidelines on recruitment into the party. They were to see to it that people were recruited on the basis of individual merit, not because they fit into a category. Top priority was put on recruiting potential "leaders" at the bench, in the fields, or in an office—that is, those likely to play active roles in "building communism." The resolutions warned local party units to put an end to their "coddling of and liberalism toward" members and candidate members whose behavior was incompatible with party membership, and to tighten up their supervision of local Komsomol organizations by giving them "more active assistance" in the indoctrination of Soviet youth and in recommending their "best members" for party membership.

The drive to improve the quality of the party membership received yet another boost from several of the changes that were made in the Party Statutes at the 23rd Congress in March-April 1966.<sup>4</sup> In the future, all applicants who were 23 years of age or younger, not just those who were 18-20 years old, could not enter the party except through the Komsomol and only with a recommendation from their local Komsomol unit. As in the past, every applicant would have to present three recommendations, but they now could come only from people with at least five, not just three, years in the party. In addition, an application now had to win the approval of two thirds of the members attending the primary party organization meeting on the matter, not just a majority of those present, before it could be forwarded to a rayon or city party committee for endorsement there.

### **A Vanguard Again**

The 1965 CPSU Central Committee decrees and the 1966 changes in the Party Statutes resulted in a sharp drop in the number of people recruited into the party, and an equally striking drop in the number of candidate members promoted to full membership.

Party recruitment hit a postwar high in 1964 and might have climbed even higher in 1965 had it not been for the slowdown in admissions after the CPSU Central Committee resolutions adopted in June and July of that year. The number of people recruited in 1966 was the lowest for any year since 1958. The brief upsurge in 1967 was prompted, for the most part, by the wave of enthusiasm during the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, but recruitment soon fell off again, probably shortly after the April 1968 CPSU Central Committee plenum reiterated the need for more discipline in the party.

Additional evidence of the impact of these measures is found in the sharp increase in the percentage, as well as in the number, of candidate members denied promotion to full membership at the end of their term on probation.

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Nearly 160,000 of those recruited during 1966-1970 failed to move up to full membership in the party at the end of their period on probation. This was a little more than five percent of the group as a whole. Only 32,000—just one percent—of those recruited during 1962-1965 had failed to move up to full membership. Even the earlier Khrushchev years could boast of a better record than that posted by the post-Khrushchev recruits. The more than 157,000 who failed to move up after having been brought into the party during 1956-1961 represented less than five percent of that group.

Meanwhile, another amendment to the Party Statutes at the 23rd Congress had made it easier for the party to rid itself of those who had violated the Party Program and the Party Statutes, or had otherwise compromised the "lofty title of communist," and this contributed to the sharp increase in expulsions during the following years (Table VI). As in the past, expulsion requires a two-thirds vote from the members at the primary party organization meeting on the matter. After that, however, it now requires only the approval of the appropriate rayon or city party committee; it no longer also requires an endorsement from the authorities at the oblast, kray, or union-republic level. Equally important, the local party units have lost the option of demoting members to candidate membership for a year on probation; expulsion is now the only way to deal with misconduct calling for more than a severe reprimand.<sup>5</sup>

From 1966 through 1970 the party membership increased by only two million, the smallest increase during any five-year period since the 1955-1959 trauma of de-Stalinization, and one million less than that during the last five years under Khrushchev (Table VII). Even at this reduced rate of growth, however, the party membership was still growing more rapidly than the population as a whole. Khrushchev's heirs had yet to halt the trend that had been transforming the party into something more akin to a mass organization. To do this, more drastic action would have to be taken in curbing recruitment and in weeding out undesirables. It is not surprising, therefore, that Brezhnev's speech at the 24th Congress in April 1971 praised the local party organizations that had followed the directives issued on such matters at the 23rd Congress, and demanded that in the future all party organizations do likewise.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Party Card Exchange**

Brezhnev also called for an exchange of party cards—the first since 1954—and emphasized that it should not be a formality, but an important organizational and political measure strengthening the party.<sup>7</sup> The congress resolution on Brezhnev's report instructed the Central Committee to carry out an exchange, but provided no guidelines on when or how to do so,<sup>8</sup> and little progress was made on the matter until the May 1972 Central Committee plenum announced that the exchange would be carried out during 1973-1974.<sup>9</sup> This delay may have been caused partly by the sensitivity of the project; most of the previous card exchanges had coincided with purges that, however varied in scope, had all had an impact on the party's size and composition. They had also had a direct bearing on the balance between democracy and discipline

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within the party, on how much effort was made to preserve Marxism-Leninism from heresy, and on the degree to which party functions were differentiated from those assigned to the other organizations and institutions.

The cautious and deliberate pace of the preparations for the exchange may also have been prompted by differences of opinion within the top leadership over what was to be accomplished by the project. Additional evidence of such differences is found in the curious manner in which the matter was presented to the Soviet public by the few party officials willing to mention the topic before the exchange actually began in March 1973.<sup>10</sup> Most of these officials agreed that expelling corrupt, scandalous, and lackadaisical members would help restore the party's elan, but some appeared to want to go further and use the card exchange as an opportunity to re-structure the party membership.<sup>11</sup>

Those pushing for large-scale expulsions apparently hoped to restore the party's status as a small vanguard in Soviet society, its elite of elites. They may also have been trying to decrease the proportion of younger members so as to ease the friction between generations that had been developing between its leadership and its rank-and-file members. They may have been equally interested in speeding up the replacement of specialists, intellectuals, and other white collar workers with blue-collar workers as the largest "social class" in the party of the "proletariat."

Such a drastic re-structuring of the party membership would have meant even tighter internal discipline, and an even less tolerant attitude toward ideas challenging the precepts of Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, it might have made it easier for the Soviet leadership to use local party units to check up on other organizations and institutions, while sharpening the distinction between the party's role and that of the other bureaucracies. In sum, it would have erased the marks of Khrushchev's reforms on the system.

It seems unlikely, however, that the recently completed card exchange has had any such dramatic impact. The regional leaders who appeared to be calling for a broad review of each member's record do not seem to have had their way. The card exchange has certainly contributed to an increase in expulsions in recent years—from approximately 100,000 in 1971 to about 150,000 in 1972, and to perhaps as many as 175,000 in 1973—but the number probably tapered off to 150,000 in 1974.<sup>12</sup> At no point has the number of expulsions in a given year represented much over one percent of the total membership, and it still falls well short of what could be properly termed a "purge."

In sum, the campaign was used to strengthen internal party discipline and to activate passive members, not to expel as many as possible—perhaps because the Soviet leadership recognized that a witch hunt might get out of hand. As a result, the party membership continued to grow during the period of preparations for and implementation of the exchange, but at a pace that was a little slower than the rates at which the adult population and the population as a whole were increasing.

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### **An Aging Party Under An Aging Leadership**

Soviet statements on the results of the card exchange have provided no details on its impact on the composition of party membership. That the problem of age is a sensitive one is suggested by the fact that Brezhnev's report at the 24th Congress in 1971 was replete with figures on the party membership at that time but said nothing about the breakdown by age groups. Instead, he discussed the need to strengthen the party's control over its youth organization, the Komsomol, and suggested that those entering the party from the Komsomol should continue to "work actively" there—that is, hold office in the Komsomol—until they received another assignment from their party units.<sup>13</sup> The most recent figures available are for January 1973, when preparations for the exchange had been almost completed, and the exchange itself was about to get under way. These figures give a clear picture of changes that had taken place up to that point and a basis for making educated guesses about the changes that have occurred since then.

First, the tightening up on admissions altered the balance between the various age groups. Party members and candidate members in the 26-40 age bracket were still the largest group in January 1973, but their percentage of the membership had dropped since January 1965. The percentage of those over 50 was higher than it had ever been in the past, as was the percentage of those who were over 60. The percentage of those who were 40 or younger was lower than ever before, and those who were only 25 or younger made up just 5.7 percent of the total and dropped to last place (*Table VIII*).

Since January 1973, the average age of party members has continued to increase. This, for the moment, has brought the party into step with its own aging leadership, but it also raised the possibility of a generation gap in the future between the party and the adult population as a whole.

People brought into the party within the last ten years—under Brezhnev's more stringent recruitment policy—made up the largest group in January 1973. Nevertheless, the percentage of those with 11-20 years in the party—the Khrushchev recruits—increased while the percentage of the membership with 21-30 years of tenure—the wartime recruits—dropped. The percentage of the people with more than 30 years in the party continued to climb, however, reaching a new high in 1973. On the other hand, for perhaps the first time in the party's history, less than 20 percent of its membership was made up of people who had joined within the last five years.<sup>14</sup>

Since January 1973, there has probably been a further decline in the percentage of the membership with five years or less in the party, and the percentage of those with more than ten years of tenure may have reached a new high. The figure for those with 11-20 years of party membership is sure to have increased since it now includes all of the holdovers from the influx during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The percentage of those with more than 30 years

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of tenure—a group that now includes all of the holdovers from the huge increases in membership during the war—is also certain to have gone up again. On the other hand, the percentage of those with 21-30 years of membership has probably dropped even further; this group now includes only the holdovers from the group that was brought into the party during the postwar years under Stalin and the first few years after his death—a period marked by highly selective recruitment and by more than one purge of the membership.

Over the years the percentage of members whose tenure in the party dates back to the earlier periods in its history has also further declined. By January 1973, the holdovers from the Lenin era made up 0.3 percent of the membership, and less than 7 percent could boast of tenure extending back to the years before World War II.<sup>15</sup> Nearly 80 percent had gained admission after the war; almost 70 percent had done so since Stalin's death; and perhaps as many as a third had joined the party after Khrushchev's fall. Meanwhile, people who joined the party before the end of the war continue to hold most of the middle-echelon posts in the party bureaucracy and in the government, and the top jobs remain, for the most part, in the hands of men who joined the party during the 1930s or earlier.

#### **Still the Party of the Proletariat**

Khrushchev's heirs have made much of the fact that their policies on party membership have made it possible for the percentage of blue collar workers in the party to reach an all-time high. The trend since January 1965 represents a continuation of the course followed during much of the Khrushchev period, however, not a new departure. The percentage of manual workers among the new candidate members has been going up since the 20th Congress in 1956, as has their percentage of the membership as a whole. The percentage of white collar clerical workers among the new recruits, and among the membership as a whole, has been declining throughout this period. The representation of the collective farm peasantry also has been dropping since the 22nd Congress in 1961, while the percentage of intellectuals and specialists in the party has continued to climb since then, even though their percentage among the new recruits has been falling since the 22nd Congress (*Table IX*).

In fact, the changes in the social composition of the party have come at a slower pace since January 1965 than they did during Khrushchev's last years in office. This is partly due to the slowdown in party recruitment, but there have been other contributing factors. The ratio between the urban and rural labor forces, for example, has been changing less rapidly, and so has the rate at which collective farms have been giving way to state farms, whose labor forces are made up of "workers." Meanwhile, the growing complexity of the Soviet economy has made the party authorities even more concerned about enrolling more specialists employed in the key sectors of the economy, and this has forced them to carry on a recruitment campaign among the better-educated sections of the population.

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### **Education and Employment Improved**

As a result, improvement in the educational background of the membership has picked up again after having slowed during the Khrushchev period. More than one fifth of the party members and candidate members in January 1973 had completed their higher education, and three fifths had at least a full secondary education. There has been only a very small drop in the odds favoring the better educated when it comes to gaining admission to the party (*Table X*).

The authorities have been proud of the improvement in the party's educational profile since January 1965, but official Soviet discussions continue to emphasize the increase in the percentage of blue collar workers among the new candidate members and among the membership as a whole. This is partly window-dressing; manual workers also seem to make up a relatively large percentage of those who are dropped from the rolls soon after gaining admission to the party. For example, blue collar workers accounted for 52.7 percent of those dropped from the rolls during 1971-1972, a period when such people made up only a little over 40 percent of the party membership as a whole. The drive to recruit more workers, nevertheless, does have significance beyond its cosmetic value. It compensates for some of the upward "seepage" of workers into the managerial class after they have joined the party; it strengthens the party's ties with the masses; and it may offset the growing influence of the technical intelligentsia within the party.

This is in keeping with the recent emphasis on selecting young blue collar party members with a secondary education—those who have been politically active and have demonstrated their reliability—for training in preparation for promotion to managerial or administrative posts. These "natural" leaders of the masses, whose role could be crucial in a crisis like that in Poland in 1970-1971, are being given a second chance to move ahead, after having missed out on going straight from high school to an institution of higher learning.

There have been only minor changes in the distribution of the party membership among the different fields of employment. The number of party members and candidate members has increased in every field. Those employed in industry or construction remain the largest group and again have registered the largest growth in their percentage of the membership. The percentage of those involved in science, education, public health, or culture also has increased, as has the figure for those employed in housing, or in civic or personal services. The percentage of those working in agriculture has continued to drop, however, as has the figure for those serving as officials of the party, the government, or the other bureaucracies. There also has been a small reduction in the percentage of party members working in transportation or communications, trade, public catering, procurements, material and technical supplies, and marketing (*Table XI*).

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The published figures do not provide a precise breakdown on the group that is made up of those not employed in the economy—those serving in the armed forces, pensioners, students, housewives, and so forth. This group now is second in size only to that of the party members and candidate members working in industry or construction. Some of the increase in its percentage of the party membership may be due to an increase in the number of party members on active duty with the armed forces, but most of it can probably be attributed to the increasing number of pensioners, students, and housewives who are party members. The aging of the membership has certainly increased the percentage of pensioners on the rolls, and the increased recruitment of students since 1970 has probably made the percentage of this group rise a bit also. A decision apparently was made at that time to have party organizations at the institutions of higher learning recruit a larger number of the best "activists" among the students, particularly those who were older and had at least some experience in "productive work." <sup>16</sup>

Soviet women would appear to have little to complain about with respect to the post-Khrushchev policy on party membership. The percentage of women among the new candidate members, and among the membership as a whole, has risen more rapidly during the last few years than during any previous period since the war. This has been especially true in the northern regions of European Russia and in the Baltic republics—areas where women now make up about one third of the party membership. <sup>17</sup> Men still outnumber women by more than three to one within the party as a whole, however, and the ratio is even higher in regions such as Central Asia, where economic conditions and cultural factors have not been conducive to recruiting women into the party (*Table XII*). Women still make up less than one third of the candidate members recruited into the party in any given year, however, and under the current trend, it will be well after 1980 before they make up much more than one fourth of the membership as a whole. <sup>18</sup>

### **Ethnic Composition**

The present leadership has frequently claimed that the party has become more "international" in recent years, but the fact is that the slowdown in overall recruitment has reduced the pace at which the ethnic minority representation has increased. Although the percentage of Russians has continued to drop—as it has in the population as a whole—they were as over-represented within the party in January 1973 as in January 1965. Meanwhile, the percentage of Ukrainians has continued to rise, as has the percentage of Belorussians, but both minorities were still somewhat under-represented within the party in January 1973. Neither had raised its party membership level to the national average at that time (*Table XII*).

The Georgians have preserved their pre-eminence among the smaller nationalities. The Armenians have had less success, and the lesser minorities lumped together as "others" also have continued to lose ground. On the other hand, the three Baltic peoples—the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians—have

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continued to improve their standing within the party. The Moldavians also have improved their position, but remain the most under-represented ethnic group in the USSR.

The situation with respect to the minorities having a Muslim background is a bit more complicated. The percentage of party members and candidate members among the Uzbeks and Azerbaydzhanis has increased little since January 1965, and the percentage among the Kazakhs, Fadziks, Kirgizis, and Turkmens has actually dropped. This, however, is mainly because of high birth rates among these peoples. It does not mean the party has neglected to recruit new members from among these minorities. In all six, party membership has grown faster than has the party as a whole. The Uzbeks, Azerbaydzhanis, and Kazakhs have also had considerable success in raising the percentage of their party membership.

The Slavic peoples—the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—still account for 80 percent of the party membership, and this situation probably will not change very much during the next ten years or so. Although several of the other national minorities are likely to better their position during this period, only the Muslim peoples—especially those in Central Asia—have the potential for growth on a scale that could cut into the Slavic majority with telling effect. They are the ones with the fastest-growing population, and they are very much under-represented within the party. Much of their population is still too young for party membership, but when the young people come of age and the local economic conditions advance a good deal more, party recruitment among those minorities could lead to a significant reduction of the Slavic majority.

### Conclusions

The party is still marked by strong contrasts in the degree to which different categories of the population are represented within its ranks; the pace at which different parts of the labor force are brought into the party has slowed, and the overall growth pattern has become slower and smoother. The party's rate of growth during the early 1970s is comparable to that for the population as a whole, retaining its status as the "elite" of Soviet society. It has also seen to it that no important segment of the population is so under-represented in the party, or so free from control by the party, that a major recruitment drive is now needed.

There are, however, some looming decisions. Admissions of young people to the party will have to increase substantially in the late 1970s and the 1980s to maintain the current level of recruitment of youth. Failure to maintain this level could lead to the development of a serious generation gap, with youth in effect frozen out of the party. As the percentage of older party members continues to rise, a recruitment drive among youth could be accomplished without significantly increasing the size of the party, but with a real impact on its age structure, as well as on the percentage of newcomers in the membership. Any such drive would re-open the possibility of the generational friction that was Khrushchev's legacy to Brezhnev. It would also re-open the vexing questions of skills and expertise. Further down the road, decisions must be made concerning the two most under-represented groups—women and the Turkic nationalities with Muslim backgrounds, particularly the latter as the Central Asian birth rate continues to rise.

1. First called the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks), the party was renamed the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1918—to symbolize its complete break with the socialist parties of the Second International, as well as with the socialist and other left-wing parties in Russia. It was renamed the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in December 1925 so that its title would be more in keeping with the formal reunification of much of the former Tsarist Empire as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in January 1924. Its name was changed to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October 1952—to give the party a more national identity; to bring the party's name into closer accord with those of the state agencies; to underline the fact that the party is a highly centralized organization, not a union of semi-autonomous regional units; and to put the members who had joined the party during the Stalin years on a par with those whose tenure in the party dated back to the period before the Bolshevik Revolution.
2. See, for example, G. Popov's article in *Pravda* on May 30, 1965.
3. "On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Party Organizations and Political Organs of the Odessa Military District and of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet with Respect to Admissions to the Party and the Education of Young Communists," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on June 22, 1965. Published in *KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moscow, 1969) pp. 377-378. "On Serious Shortcomings in the Work of the Kharkov Oblast Party Organization with Respect to Admissions to the Party and the Education of Young Communists," Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee adopted on July 20, 1965. Published in *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika*, Sixth Edition, 1966, pp. 383-386.
4. *The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report* (Moscow, 1966) Vol. II, pp. 318-320.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report* (Moscow, 1971) Vol. I, p. 118.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.
8. *Ibid.*, Vol II, p.238.
9. *Pravda*, May 20, 1972.
10. P. Shelest, *Kommunist* No. 12, August 1971, pp. 14-31; K. Chernenko, *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* No. 9, September 1971, pp. 3-18; V. Grishin, *Moskovskaya Pravda*, January 13, 1972; I. Kapitonov, *Kommunist* No. 3, February 1972, pp. 29-46; N. Zolotarev, *Kommunist* No. 6, April 1972, pp. 80-91; I. Kebin, *Sovetskaya Estonia*, July 1, 1972; I. Lutak, *Pravda Ukrainy*, September 15, 1972; and L. Grekov, *Kommunist* No. 2, January 1973, pp. 24-35.

11. Among those who appeared to be pushing for large-scale expulsions were: Shelest, then first secretary of the Ukrainian Republic party organization; Grishin, first secretary of the Moscow city party organization; Lutak, second secretary of the Ukrainian Republic party organization; and Grekov, second secretary of the Moscow city party organization. It is noteworthy that both Shelest and Grishin were Politburo members at that time, and that they were the only Politburo members to mention the card exchange in public during the period in question.

12. These figures are suggested by the gap between the number of people brought into the party and the actual increase in the party membership during the years in question. Part of that gap, of course, represents attrition prompted by other causes—deaths, voluntary withdrawals from the party, etc.—but the overall size of the gap suggests that expulsions were running between 100,000 and 175,000 per year during the early 1970s. Moreover, there is one Soviet hint that such was the case; a discussion of the results of the card exchange in *Kommunist* No. 5, March 1975, says that “only an insignificant percentage of party members were expelled from or left the party during the exchange.” While far from precise, this would be in keeping with the figures offered above. *Kommunist* No. 5, March 1975, p. 10.

13. “Otchetniy Doklad TsK KPSS XXIV Syezdy Partii, Razvitiye Partii i Nekotoriye Voprosy Vnutripartiinoi Zhizni.” *XXIV Syezda Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Moscow, 1971) Vol. I, pp. 117-131. The emphasis on the need to further strengthen the party’s control over the Komsomol is particularly striking in light of the remarks by Komsomol first secretary V. M. Tyazhelnikov at the congress. He noted that the party nucleus within the Komsomol had doubled since the 23rd Congress, and that the party stratum among secretaries in primary Komsomol organizations had tripled during the same five-year period.

14. *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 19.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Pravda*, November 12, 1971

17. *Partinaya Zhizn*, No. 14, July 1973, p. 19.

18. In January 1965, 14.8 percent of the adult males were party members or candidate members, but only 2.8 percent of the adult females had been brought into the party; the ratio between the party membership levels at that time was 5.3 to 1.0 in favor of the men. By January 1973, 15.6 percent of the adult males were party members or candidate members, and the figure for adult females had risen to 3.7 percent; as a result, the ratio between the party membership levels had dropped to 4.2 to 1.0 in favor of the men.

Table I

Party Membership: 1945-1965

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Party Members	Candidate Members	Total Membership	Percentage of Adult Population	Percentage of Total Population
1945	3,965,530	1,749,839	5,790,369	N. A.	3.2
1950	5,510,787	829,396	6,340,183	5.6	3.5
1955	6,610,238	346,867	6,957,105	5.5	3.6
1960	8,017,249	391,418	8,708,667	6.2	4.1
1965	10,811,443	346,726	11,758,169	8.0	5.1

The figures on party membership are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 10. The figures for the percentage of party members among the adult population and among the entire population are based on the estimated population figures in *Soviet Economic Prospects For The Seventies: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States*, June 27, 1973; pp. 472-474.

Table II

Age and Party Tenure: 1945-1965

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Age Group					Number of Years in the Party					
	25	35	40	50	51+	0-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41+	31
1945	18.0%	64.0%									
1952		45.0%					66.0%		29.0%	5.0%	
1956			53.0%				42.0%		51.0%	7.0%	
1957						44.2%		50.9%			3.9%
1961							40.0%		52.0%	8.0%	
1962						39.0%		56.2%			4.8%
1965	7.2%		54.0%	78.8%	21.2%	42.8%		54.3%			5.9%

The figures on age groups in 1945 are from *Partinoye Stroitelstvo* No. 4, February 1946, p. 28; those on age groups in 1952 and 1956 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 50; those for 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 13. The figures on party tenure in 1952, 1956, and 1961 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 49; those for 1957 are in *Kommunist* No. 15, October 1967, pp. 99-100; those for 1962 and 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 13.

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Table III

## Social Composition: 1946-1966

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Blue Collar Workers	Collective Farm Peasantry	Officials, Intelligentsia, and Other White Collar Workers
1946	1,865,126 = 33.8%	1,023,903 = 18.6%	2,621,833 = 47.6%
1952	2,162,059 = 32.2	1,206,668 = 18.0	3,338,812 = 49.8
1956	2,291,455 = 32.0	1,227,767 = 17.1	3,654,299 = 50.9
1961	3,146,135 = 33.9	1,632,847 = 17.6	4,496,844 = 48.5
1962	3,461,874 = 35.0	1,711,155 = 17.3	4,718,039 = 47.7
1965	4,385,797 = 37.3	1,940,098 = 16.5	5,432,274 = 46.2
1966	4,675,879 = 37.8	1,999,138 = 16.2	5,682,291 = 46.0

The figures for 1946, 1952, 1956, 1961, and 1966 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 15. Those for 1962 and 1965 are based on the percentage figures in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 11.

Table IV

## Education Levels: 1946-1965

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Higher Education	Incomplete Higher Education	Secondary Education	Incomplete Secondary Education	Elementary Education	No Elementary Education
1946	7.3%	2.2%	23.3%	24.6%	34.4%	8.2%
1952	8.9	2.8	22.2	27.6	31.4	7.1
1956	11.2	3.6	22.2	29.6	28.4	5.0
1961	13.2	3.0	26.2	28.6	25.8	3.2
1962	13.7	2.9	27.2	28.4	27.8	....
1965	15.0	2.6	30.1	27.9	24.4	....

The figures for 1946, 1952, 1956, 1961, and 1966 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 16. Those for 1962 and 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 11.

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Table V

National Composition: 1946-1965

Nationality	Number of Communists			Percentage of Membership		
	Jan. 1946	Jul. 1961	Jan. 1965	1946	1961	1965
Russians	3,736,165	6,116,700	7,335,200	67.8	63.54	62.34
Ukrainians	667,481	1,412,200	1,813,400	12.1	14.67	15.21
Belorussians	114,799	287,000	386,000	2.1	2.98	3.40
Uzbeks	61,467	142,700	193,600	1.1	1.48	1.65
Kazakhs	92,354	149,200	181,300	1.7	1.56	1.55
Georgians	107,910	170,400	194,300	2.0	1.77	1.67
Armenians	100,449	161,200	187,900	1.8	1.67	1.61
Azerbaydzhanis	55,448	106,100	141,900	1.0	1.10	1.22
Lithuanians	3,704	42,800	61,500	0.1	0.44	0.53
Latvians	8,408	33,900	44,300	0.1	0.35	0.39
Moldavians	2,913	26,700	40,300	0.1	0.28	0.35
Tadzhiks	13,757	32,700	41,900	0.2	0.34	0.37
Estonians	7,976	24,400	33,900	0.1	0.25	0.30
Kirgizis	14,039	27,300	35,000	0.3	0.28	0.31
Turkmenis	12,675	27,300	32,400	0.2	0.28	0.29
Others	514,104	866,100	1,035,300	9.3	9.00	8.81

	Communists per 1,000 of National Population		Party Membership Rate as a Percentage of USSR Average	
	Jul. 1961	Jan. 1965	Jul. 1961	Jan. 1965
USSR	44	52	100	100
Russians	52	60	118	115
Ukrainians	36	46	82	89
Belorussians	35	45	80	87
Uzbeks	23	25	52	48
Kazakhs	38	40	86	77
Georgians	61	65	139	125
Armenians	55	59	125	113
Azerbaydzhanis	35	38	80	73
Lithuanians	18	24	41	46
Latvians	23	30	52	58
Moldavians	12	16	27	31
Tadzhiks	22	23	50	44
Estonians	25	34	57	65
Kirgizis	27	28	61	54
Turkmenis	26	25	59	48
Others	67	57	152	110

The figures for party membership in 1946 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 18; those for 1961 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 49; those for 1965 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 12. The figures on party membership among the national minorities are based upon the population figures in *Soviet Economic Prospects For The Seventies: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States*, June 27, 1973, p. 481.

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Table VI

## Recruitment Into and Expulsion From the Party: 1956-1975

Year	Candidate Members Recruited	Candidate Members Promoted to Full Membership	Party Members and Candidate Members Expelled
1956	380,944	283,211	
1957	423,591	353,748	
1958	480,507	395,792	
1959	579,412	488,174	
1960	672,879	545,155	
1961	712,981	658,806	
1962	660,239	651,301	31,370
1963	771,439	705,027	34,045
1964	879,428	740,829	30,763
1965	735,357	840,959	
1966	510,955	727,597	62,868
1967	668,697		52,226
1968	647,441	2,260,645	66,000*
1969	579,346		
1970	581,506		
1971	493,136	567,616	
1972	468,990	470,609	
1973			
1974	550,000		
1975			

\*The number of expulsions during 1966-1968 totaled 171,000 I. N. Yudin, *Sotsialnaya Baza Rosta KPSS* (Moscow, 1973) p. 289. No figures are available on expulsions in the years since then, but the evidence suggests that the number has been 100,000 or more during the last few years (see below).

The figures on recruitment and promotions during 1956-1960 are found in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 45. The figures for 1961-1964 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 9. Those for 1965 and for 1968-1972 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 12-14, and the figure on recruitment in 1974 is found in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 6, March 1975, p. 7. The figures on expulsions during 1962-1964 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 10; the figure for 1966 is from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 7, April 1967, p. 8; the figure for 1967 is in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 7, April 1968, p. 27; and the figure for 1968 is based on the 1966-1968 figure in I. N. Yudin, cited above.

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Table VII

Party Membership: 1965-1975

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Party Members	Candidate Members	Total Membership	Percentage of Adult Population	Percentage of Total Population
1965	10,811,443	946,726	11,758,169	8.0	5.1
1966	11,548,287	809,021	12,357,308		
1967	12,135,103	549,030	12,684,133		
1968	12,484,836	695,389	13,180,225		
1969	12,958,303	681,588	13,639,891		
1970	13,395,253	616,531	14,011,784	8.8	5.8
1971	13,745,980	626,583	14,372,563	8.9	5.9
1972	14,109,432	521,857	14,631,289	9.0	5.9
1973	14,330,525	490,506	14,821,031	8.9	6.0
1974	14,493,524	532,391	15,025,915	8.9	6.0
1975			15,295,000	8.9	6.0

The figures on party membership for 1965-1973 are in *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 10; those for 1974 are in *Knizhka Partiinogo Aktivista* (Moscow, 1974) p. 19 and the figure for 1975 is from *Kommunist* No. 5, March 1975, p. 11. The figures for the percentage of party members among the adult population and among the entire population are based on the estimated population figures in *Soviet Economic Prospects For The Seventies: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States*; June 27, 1974, pp. 472-474.

Table VIII

Age and Party Tenure: 1965-1975

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Age Group							Years in the Party			
	25	26-40	40	41-50	50	51	61	0-10	11-20	21-30	31
1965	7.2%	46.8%	54.0%	24.8%	78.8%	21.2%		42.8%	51.3%	5.9%	
1966	6.2	46.8	53.0	24.9	77.9	22.1		47.1	47.3	5.6	
1967	5.0	46.5	51.5	25.6	77.1	22.9		48.3	20.8	25.9	5.0
1968											
1969											
1970											
1971								45.8	23.2	23.7	7.3
1972											
1973	5.7	38.4	44.1	29.2	73.3	26.7	10.4	41.6	26.9	22.1	9.4
1974											
1975											

The figures for 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 13. Those for 1966 are from *The 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: A Stenographic Report* (Moscow, 1966), Vol. I, p. 86. Those for 1967 are from *Kommunist* No. 15, October 1967, p. 25. Those for 1971 are from N. Petrovich et al., *Partinoye Stroitelstvo: Uchebnoye Posobiye* (Moscow, 1971) p. 85. Those for 1973 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 19. An awareness of the aging problem probably prompted the silence on age groups in 1971. It is also noteworthy that the number of the communists over 60 reached a point in 1973 where it received, for the first time, separate mention in the party statistics.



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Table IX

## Social Composition: 1956-1975

Date	Blue Collar Workers	Collective Farm Peasantry	Officials, Specialists, and Intellectuals	Other White Collar Workers
A: Candidate Members Recruited Into The Party				
1956-1961	1,335,890 = 41.1%	715,075 = 22.0%	793,083 = 24.4%	406,266 = 12.5%
1962-1965	1,361,769 = 44.7	456,970 = 15.0	889,567 = 29.2	338,157 = 11.1
1966-1970	1,553,661 = 52.0	400,366 = 13.4	809,696 = 27.1	224,086 = 7.5
1971	280,594 = 56.9	58,683 = 11.9	124,764 = 25.3	29,095 = 5.9
1972	268,731 = 57.3	54,872 = 11.7	119,593 = 25.5	25,794 = 5.5
1973				
1974				
1975				
B: Total Membership of The Party				
Jan. 1956	2,291,455 = 32.0%	1,227,767 = 17.1%	1,867,347 = 26.0%	1,786,952 = 24.9%
Jan. 1961	3,146,135 = 33.9	1,632,847 = 17.6	2,653,138 = 28.6	1,843,706 = 19.9
Jan. 1962	3,461,874 = 35.0	1,711,155 = 17.3	2,828,845 = 28.6	1,889,194 = 19.1
Jan. 1965	4,385,797 = 37.3	1,940,098 = 16.5	3,456,902 = 29.4	1,975,372 = 16.8
Jan. 1966	4,675,879 = 37.8	1,999,138 = 16.2	3,682,125 = 29.8	2,000,166 = 16.2
Jan. 1971	5,759,379 = 40.1	2,169,437 = 15.1	4,536,398 = 31.5	1,907,349 = 13.3
Jan. 1973	6,037,771 = 40.7	2,169,764 = 14.7	4,741,877 = 32.0	1,871,619 = 12.6

The figures on the social composition of the candidate members are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 13. The figures on the social composition of the party membership as a whole in 1956, 1966, 1971, and 1973 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 15-16; those for 1961 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 15 and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 11; and those for 1962 and 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 11.

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Table X

Education Levels: 1956-1975

(on January 1 of the corresponding year)

Date	Higher Education	Incomplete Higher	Secondary Education	Incomplete Secondary	Elementary Education	No Elementary Education
A: Party Member and Candidate Members						
1956	11.2%	3.6%	22.2%	29.6%	28.4%	5.0%
1961	13.2	3.0	26.2	28.6	28.5	3.2
1962	13.7	2.9	27.2	28.4	27.8*	..
1965	15.0	2.6	30.1	27.9	24.4*	..
1966	15.7	2.5	30.9	27.5	23.4*	..
1971	19.6	2.4	34.3	24.9	18.8*	..
1973	21.6	2.2	36.1	23.0	17.1*	..
1975						
B: Adult Population (20 years of age or older)						
1959	2.9%	1.2%	11.5%	19.6%	64.7%*	..
1970	5.5	1.7	20.8	23.5	48.5*	..
C: Estimated Party Membership Among Adult Population						
1959	27.0%		14.0%**	9.5%	2.9%*	..
1970	31.9		15.0	10.1	3.8*	..

\*This figure certainly includes some people with no elementary education, but party statistics no longer include them as a group receiving separate mention.

\*\*The figure for those with incomplete higher education has been combined with that for those with a secondary education as a matter of convenience in light of the relatively small number of people with an incomplete higher education.

The figures on the party membership's educational levels in 1956, 1961, 1966, 1971, and 1973 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 16. Those for 1962 and 1965 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 11. The figures on the adult population's educational levels in 1959 are from *Itoqi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1959 Goda* (Moscow, 1962) pp. 74-75. Those for 1970 are from *Itoqi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 Goda* (Moscow, 1972) Vol. III p. 6. Since no 1959 or 1970 educational breakdown of the party membership is available, the figures on the party membership levels in 1959 and in 1970 reflect estimates, derived from using the party membership figures for 1956 and 1961 in the first case, and those for 1966 and 1971 in the second.

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Table XI

## Fields of Employment: 1956-1975

	Jan. 1956	Jan. 1961	Jan. 1967	Jan. 1973
Total Party Membership	7,173,521 = 100.0%	9,275,826 = 100.0%	12,684,133 = 100.0%	14,821,031 = 100.0%
Employed in Soviet Economy:	5,816,117 = 81.8	7,526,782 = 81.2	10,541,701 = 83.1	12,231,187 = 82.5
Material Production Sectors:	4,123,627 = 58.0	5,373,836 = 58.0*	7,727,057 = 60.9	8,940,998 = 60.2
Industry or Construction	1,863,175 = 26.2	2,497,239 = 27.2	3,862,098 = 30.4	4,684,731 = 31.6
Transportation or Communications	599,060 = 8.4	692,556 = 7.5	948,753 = 7.5	1,015,189 = 6.8
Agriculture	1,318,241 = 18.6	1,778,541 = 18.9	2,336,412 = 18.4	2,568,363 = 17.3
Trade, Public Catering, Procurements, Material and Technical Supplies, or Marketing	325,703 = 4.6	405,500 = 4.4	463,835 = 3.7	538,172 = 3.6
Other Material Production Sectors	17,448 = 0.2	.....*	115,959 = 0.9	134,543 = 0.9
Nonproduction Sectors:	1,692,490 = 23.8	2,152,946 = 23.2**	2,814,644 = 22.2	3,290,189 = 22.2
Science, Education, Public Health, or Culture	727,015 = 10.2	1,174,334 = 12.7	1,739,386 = 13.7	2,042,608 = 13.8
Officials of Party, Government, or Other Bureaucracies	895,682 = 12.6	813,000 = 8.8	938,216 = 7.4	1,051,882 = 7.1
Housing, Civic Services, or Personal Services	69,793 = 1.2	165,612 = 1.8**	137,042 = 1.1	195,699 = 1.3
Not Employed in Soviet Economy:	1,357,404 = 18.2	1,749,044 = 18.8	2,142,432 = 16.9	2,589,844 = 17.5

\*The party statistics for 1961 do not give a separate figure for those working in "other material production sectors," and they apparently were not included in any of the specific sectors of material production.

\*\*The wording of the description of the "housing, civic services, and personal services" category in the 1961 statistics suggests that this group may have also included the party members and candidate members actually employed in "other material production sectors."

The figures for 1956 and 1973 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 20-21. Those for 1961 are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 1, January 1962, p. 50, and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 21. Those for 1967 are from *Kommunist* No. 15, October 1967, pp. 99-100.

Table XII

Women in the Party: 1946-1975

	A: Candidate Members	B: Party Members and Candidate Members	
	Recruited:		
1941-1945		Jan. 1946	1,033,115 = 18.7%
1946-1951		Jan. 1952	1,276,560 = 19.0%
1952-1955	219,265 = 21.8%	Jan. 1956	1,414,456 = 19.7%
1956-1961	584,630 = 18.0%	Jan. 1962	1,942,080 = 19.6%
1962-1965	659,803 = 21.7%	Jan. 1966	2,548,901 = 20.6%
1966-1970	767,424 = 25.7%	Jan. 1971	3,195,556 = 22.2%
1971-1972	279,412 = 29.0%	Jan. 1973	3,412,029 = 23.0%

The figure for women party members and candidate members in January 1962 is from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 13. The other figures on party members and candidate members, and all the figures on recruitment, are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, pp. 14 and 18.

Table XIII

National Composition: 1965-1973

Nationality	Number of Communists		Percentage of Membership	
	Jan. 1965	Jan. 1973	Jan. 1965	Jan. 1973
Russians	7,335,200	9,025,363	62.34	60.90
Ukrainians	1,813,400	2,369,200	15.21	15.95
Belorussians	386,000	521,544	3.40	3.52
Uzbeks	193,600	291,550	1.65	1.96
Kazakhs	181,300	254,667	1.55	1.72
Georgians	194,300	246,214	1.67	1.66
Armenians	187,900	225,132	1.61	1.52
Azerbaijdzhanis	141,900	212,122	1.22	1.43
Lithuanians	61,500	96,558	0.53	0.65
Latvians	44,300	61,755	0.39	0.42
Moldavians	40,300	59,434	0.35	0.40
Tadzhiks	41,900	58,668	0.37	0.40
Estonians	33,900	46,424	0.30	0.31
Kirgizis	35,000	46,049	0.31	0.31
Turkmens	32,400	44,218	0.29	0.30
Others	1,035,300	1,262,133	8.81	8.55

Nationality	Communists per 1,000 of National Population		Party Membership Rate as a Percentage of USSR Average	
	Jan. 1965	Jan. 1973	Jan. 1965	Jan. 1973
USSR	52	59	100	100
Russians	60	68	115	115
Ukrainians	46	57	89	97
Belorussians	45	56	87	95
Uzbeks	25	29	48	49
Kazakhs	40	44	77	75
Georgians	65	73	125	124
Armenians	59	60	113	102
Azerbaijdzhanis	38	44	73	75
Lithuanians	24	35	46	59
Latvians	30	41	58	70
Moldavians	16	21	31	36
Tadzhiks	23	25	44	42
Estonians	34	46	65	78
Kirgizis	28	29	54	49
Turkmens	25	26	48	44
Others	57	45	110	76

The figures on party membership are from *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 10, May 1965, p. 12, and *Partinaya Zhizn* No. 14, July 1973, p. 18. The figures on party membership among the national minorities are based on the population figures in *Soviet Economic Prospects For The Seventies: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States*; June 27, 1973, p. 481.

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